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Abstract
This paper critically reviews and identifies gaps in the methodologies used to analyze the
environmental impacts of mineral and metal global supply chains. Of specific focus are
assessments of the extraction and production of minerals and metals needed for a low-carbon
energy future. Current trends and projections suggest that the future low-carbon energy system
will have greater material needs than the current one. Thus, it is important to better understand the
full impacts of increased resource extraction to help ensure a sustainable and just transition. This
review reveals that existing methodologies are currently insufficient in capturing the full suite of
environmental, social, and governance concerns. The copper supply chain is used as a case study to
highlight areas that require refined or augmented methodologies, with an in-depth examination of
the corporate practices of Freeport-McMoRan, Vale, and BHP. Together, this review of existing
methodologies and examples from the copper supply chain highlight the incomplete and variable
nature of environmental and climate reporting within the mining industry. Areas for future work
are defined with the goal of advancing accounting frameworks for the mining industry and the
associated supply chain.
1. Introduction
While low-carbon technologies have become eco-
nomically competitive over the past decade, they
also have relatively high material needs and differ-
ent environmental impacts than the current energy
system. A steadily growing body of reports and fore-
casts examining the demand for materials required
for the energy transition has shown that an unpre-
pared extractive industry could struggle to keep up
with rapid increases in demand, and in some cases
exceed current reserves by 2050 [1–9]. In particu-
lar, an analysis by the World Bank of total min-
eral demand for renewable power and energy storage
shows that up to 200 million tons of iron, 100 mil-
lion tons of aluminum, and the 30 million tons of
copper might be required for wind, solar, and battery
storage alone [1]. Similarly, increases in demand for
other minerals and metals used in low-carbon tech-
nology may also increase dramatically [10, 11]. Given
the global climate goals tied to 2050,meeting themin-
eral requirements for the energy transition is of key
strategic importance.
While material estimates serve as a first-order
indication of scale, economists, e.g. Tilton et al
(2018), argue that material shortages will be short-
lived (if at all), and Mudd and Jowitt (2018) argue
that the key factors governing mining and mineral
extraction are not physical in nature, but social,
environmental, and economic [13, 14]. Following
this and the strong relationship between develop-
ing economies and the extractive industry, Environ-
mental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting has
become a focal point for mining corporations look-
ing to address a legacy of environmental degradation
and the numerous environmental uncertainties sur-
rounding increasing extraction of resources [11].
As there is no universally accepted or enforced
international regulation, nor any global market
driven certification schemes, the extractive industry
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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has turned internally to ESG propositions, sustain-
ability reports, and other voluntary disclosures to
relay ‘impact on critical sustainability issues such
as climate change, human rights, governance and
social well-being’ [15, p 1, 11]. Public acknowledge-
ment of these concerns has led to calls for increased
transparency from mining operations, but they are
still not well understood [11, 16, 17]. Among these,
environmental impacts are perhaps the most mis-
characterized despite their strong relationship with
social and governance considerations. Climate agree-
ments and advocacy groups for renewable techno-
logies have presented the environmental impacts of
resource extraction as a global problem that requires
global solutions. To this end, virtually every nation
on Earth has adopted the Paris Agreement with the
understanding that emissions can be quantified, con-
trolled, and regulated [18]. Nations troubled by con-
flicts and extreme poverty have signed the agreement
with the understanding that the global environment
can be independent the numerous social and gov-
ernance issues, and that developmental changes can
be implemented. Ultimately, companies are respons-
ible for making changes to align their operations with
the Paris Agreement; themining industry has played a
role in these developments, but their ability to report
on, yet alone address, these changes can no longer be
considered adequate. While indicators and report-
ing systems exist for geological, technical, structural,
political, regulatory, and economic supply risks
within the industry, ‘there is currently no holistic
method and information system for environmental
concerns associated with the mining of rawmaterials’
[19, p 1].
With no universal methodology that can assess
environmental impacts consistently for minerals and
metals, how effective are the current frameworks
at relaying relevant environmental concerns? How
effectively are international environmental concerns
being assessed and governed? What does this mean
for the energy transition? To answer these questions,
this review presents a problem-oriented perspect-
ive aimed at identifying gaps in the current report-
ing of environmental issues across the mineral and
metal supply chains supporting the energy trans-
ition. Of specific concern are environmental impacts
from extraction and production of minerals and
metals.
Published ESG reports, greenhouse gas (GHG)
calculation standards, reporting questionnaires, and
academic literature were collected and evaluated to
understand potential flaws and points of conten-
tion [1–97]. CDP reports for the 2018 reporting
year formed the initial data source due to their
consistent structure and organization. The reports
chosen were based on mineral production quantit-
ies. Of the top ten copper producers, only six repor-
ted to CDP, and only five are members of the ICMM
[42, 44, 88]. From these five companies, 2018 Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) reports were used as sec-
ondary sources to compare required disclosure cat-
egories [89, 90–97]. Inconsistencies and changes in
relative focus between companies and their reports
were categorized and are outlined below. They were
then further contextualized through full-length peer-
reviewed academic papers comparing GRI reports,
mining disclosures, and emissions from mineral
sources. This review then focused on grey literature
and white papers that were used within GRImethods,
GHG protocol methods, and CDP questionnaires.
From this, copper was chosen as a case study due to
its critical role in renewable technologies, its produc-
tion by many of the world’s largest mining compan-
ies, and its complex emissions life cycle. Unlike steel
or aluminum production, which has its primary cli-
mate impacts on processing, copper has GHG emis-
sions associated with extraction, hauling, comminu-
tion, and processing. Discrepancies among reporting
methods and relevant background information were
organized into effective categories to form the sec-
tions of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: section 2 reviews the current environmental
impacts ofmining. Section 3 evaluates the state of cor-
poratemining reports. Section 4 analyzes what is gen-
erally included in reports, whereas section 5 discusses
missing information along the supply chain. To put all
of this into context, and also offer a timely empirical
case study, section 6 evaluates copper’s representa-
tion on corporatemining reports. Section 7 concludes
with areas for future investigation.
2. Current environmental impacts of
mining
Environmental impacts from the mining industry
include GHG emissions, ecotoxicity impacts, and
human toxicity impacts, as outlined by the United
Nations in their annual resources outlook report
and figure 1 [12]. In the mining industry, these
impacts primarily come from the common metals
that account for >95% of global domestic extrac-
tion, namely iron, steel, aluminum, and copper [12].
However, the materials needed for the energy trans-
ition can compound these environmental concerns.
With many renewable materials expected to rapidly
increase in demand, new climate change impacts and
toxicity sources are likely. It is therefore important to
understand the potential environmental impacts of
both common metals and specific materials needed
for renewable technology.
Despite attempts at improved governance and
better corporate management, procurement of many
mineral and metal resources remains environment-
ally capricious and, in some cases, a source of conflict
at the sites of resource extraction [20]. Due to lack of
preventative strategies and measures, such as drilling
with water and proper exhaust ventilation, many
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Figure 1.Metal production amounts and environmental impacts of metal mining and processing from 2000 to 2015 (selection of
ten metals covering >95% of global domestic extraction of metal ores in 2015). Reprinted with permission from [12].
cobalt mines throughout the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) contribute to deforestation, tail-
ings pollution, landslides, dust, and fugitive emis-
sions from diesel generators and trucks (figure 2)
[21, 22]. Mining for copper, needed for electric wires
and circuits, thin-film solar cells, as well as lithium,
used in batteries, has been criticized in Chile for
depleting local water resources across the Atacama
Desert, destroying fragile ecosystems, and convert-
ing meadows and lagoons into salt flats [23]. The
extraction, crushing, refining, and processing of cad-
mium, a byproduct of zinc mining, into compounds
for thin-film photovoltaic modules that use cad-
mium telluride or cadmium sulfide semiconductors,
can lead to groundwater or agricultural soil contam-
ination, or worker exposure to hazardous chemic-
als (cadmium chloride), and occupational air pol-
lution [24]. Rare earth minerals, such as neody-
mium, are needed for magnets in electric generat-
ors and motors, electric vehicles, and the fluid cata-
lysts for shale gas fracking. But their mining in China
has resulted in chemical pollution from ammonium
sulfate and ammonium chloride that now threaten
rural groundwater aquifers as well as rivers and
streams [25].
Mining and metals processing also have sub-
stantial carbon footprints. Due to its large ore
volumes and high processing needs, the global
iron-steel production chain is already responsible
for as much as 7%–9% of direct GHG emis-
sions [27, 28]. When combined with aluminum’s
high energy requirements and copper’s processing
impacts, the three metals have come to represent
more than one-quarter of global industrial energy
demand and associated emissions (figure 1) [12]. In
consideration with other commonly produced min-
erals and metals, the climate (global) and health
(local) impacts from extraction and production has
nearly doubled between 2000–2015, and represent
over 10%of globalGHGemissions, and 12%of global
particulate matter health impacts [12]. When includ-
ing non-metallic minerals, the extractive industry
accounts for as much as 20% of global GHG and 20%
of global particulate matter emissions [12] (figure 1).
Looking at future trends, environmental impacts
may grow, rather than recede, and large increases
in mineral and metal demand specifically for the
energy transition can compound environmental con-
cerns (figure 3). The Institute for Sustainable Futures’
report Responsible Minerals Sourcing for Renewable
Energy explores some of these ‘hotspots’ [29, p 1],
and found significant environmental impacts associ-
ated with the mining and processing of these metals
[29]. For the 14 materials needed for renewable
technologies that they explored, they found issues
with large volumes of solid waste, harmful chemic-
als, heavy metal contamination (air, water, and soil),
water shortages, tailing spills, and broader health
impacts for workers and surrounding communities
[29]. Increases in cumulative demand through 2050
for cobalt, lithium, and rare earths were found to be
of specific concern due to the rapid growth of vehicle
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Figure 2. The multi-dimensional environmental impacts of copper and cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) [26]. Copyright © 2020, Elsevier.
Figure 3.Mineral growth as a percentage of 2017 production to 2050 (only) [11].
electrification and the acceleration of battery storage
technology (figures 4–6) [29]. For cobalt, 65% of the
world’s supply comes from the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (figures 4–6), which has a history of
environmental and social abuse, and is part of one of
the ten most polluted places on Earth (African Cop-
per Belt) [29, 30]. Rare earth elements (REEs) have
also already caused significant problems in China due
to toxic chemicals and the technologically-enhanced,
concentrated, radioactive materials from REE pro-
cessing and extraction [25, 29]. Lithium brine extrac-
tion, while less energy intensive than other processes,
poses potential problems due to an expected 1000%
increase in demand and the lack of long-term envir-
onmental investigations into the extraction’s effects
on one of the most arid locations on Earth [29].
The ability to track mineral and metal sources
is also becoming increasingly relevant, both to
capture the full environmental impacts of a mater-
ial, and because impacts are often disproportion-
ately felt by developing countries. Increases in mine-
ral demand present numerous opportunities for low-
income countries focused on resource extraction and
processing, but also can mean that operations may
take place in environmentally sensitive areas such as
forests, rivers, and coastlines, and sometimes without
robust governance structures and regulations in place
[31]. The 2017 Resource Governance Index found
that across different minerals, on average, 37% of
mineral reserves are in countries with a mix of strong
and problematic areas of resource governance [31].
These problematic areas imply that resource extrac-
tion can help society, but it is likely that the eventual
benefits to the surrounding areas will be weak [31].
A further 7% of minerals were in countries that
have minimal procedures and practices to govern
4
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Figure 4.Minerals used in selected transport technologies [32].
Figure 5.Minerals used in selected electricity supply technologies [32].
resources, wheremost of elements necessary to ensure
societal benefits were found to bemissing [31]. Coun-
tries with weak of poor governance are less likely to
adopt policies that can benefit citizens, communities,
environmental health, and mining operations [31].
McKinsey and Company’s 2020 report on climate
risk for mining companies warns of climate change
hazards ‘increasing physical challenges to mining
operations’ [33, p 1], with water stress and flood-
ing being direct challenges that operators will need
to overcome [33]. Analysis of the MineSpans data-
base for copper, gold, iron ore, and zinc, found
that 30%–50% of production already occurs in areas
with high water stress, and that ‘these hot spots
will worsen in the coming decades’ [33, p 3]. While
more capital-intensive approaches and water intens-
ity reductions can help to mitigate negative effects,
shifting demand for minerals, and calls for the
industry to decarbonize, present their own problems.
With coal representing 50%of the globalminingmar-
ket and ‘the most obvious victim’ [33, p 5] of shifts to
global decarbonization, many mining companies will
need to rebalance non diverse mineral portfolios and
begin considering the impacts of a circular economy
[33]. Production of niche commodities can help to
manage losses, but companies also need to look at
decarbonizing through several operational levers (fig-
ure 7), with the understanding that ‘building a climate
strategy will not be quick or easy—but waiting is not
an option’ [33, p 1].
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Figure 6. Geographic concentration of supply chains [32].
Figure 7. Pathways for mitigating the greenhouse gas emissions in mining [16].
3. Evaluating the state of corporate mining
reports
3.1. Background
Amix of emerging sustainable development concepts
being applied within industry, high ESG sector risk
analyses (figure 8), and global commodity markets,
have all resulted in increasing economic pressure for
mining companies to report and reduce their envir-
onmental impacts. For example, a KPMG survey of
corporate sustainability reporting found that 93% of
the world’s largest 250 companies now publish sus-
tainability reports, while the CDP claims that over
8400 companies have reported through them regard-
ing climate change, water security, and forest health
[34, 35]. A core tenet of the literature on corpor-
ate social responsibility is that private firms must not
only meet their fiduciary responsibility to sharehold-
ers and their legal responsibility to avoid fraud and
illicit activities; they must also promote a broader
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Figure 8. ESG sector risk analysis. Reprinted with permission from [39].
Figure 9.Mining company reporting relationships and requirements.
social agenda. This agenda frequently includes facil-
itating the prosperity of communities, minimizing
environmental degradation, and contributing to the
creation of safe and peaceful societies with strong
institutions and equitable distribution of costs and
benefits [36]. Gallarotti (1995) even suggested, writ-
ing more than two decades ago, that the business
community was beginning to shift towards ‘green
consumption,’ [37, p 43] a transition that had the
potential to create ‘a new business ecosystem’ [37,
p 50] enhanced by the principles of human rights,
transparency, and sound governance [37].
For the mining industry, their substantial role in
sustainability reporting began after an economic and
social crisis in themid-to-late 1990s which threatened
the industry’s ‘social license to operate’ [38, p 1], and
resulted in the creation of the International Council
of Mining and Metals (ICMM) [38].
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Following its formalization in 1999, the Global
Mining Initiative (soon to become the ICMM), began
working closely with the Global Reporting Initiat-
ive (GRI) to develop a reporting supplement aimed
at ‘a clearer understanding of the positive role the
mining and minerals industries can play in man-
aging the transition to sustainable development’ [38,
p 18, 40]. Membership to the ICMM now requires
that companies report their sustainability impacts in
accordance with the GRI’s Mining and Metals Sec-
tor Supplement, and seek independent assurance of
their reports [41]. The ICMM now includes 26 of the
world’s largest mining and metals companies, and 35
associations aimed at addressing ‘the core sustainable
development challenges faced by the industry’ [42,
p 1]. The mining industry has also started report-
ing to independent organizations such as the CDP,
Science Based Targets (SBT), and Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), who
help structure sustainability reporting and maintain
the disclosures as a primary source for a company’s
ESG developments.
3.2. Numerous reporting initiatives and standards
The GRI and other reporting frameworks are
meant to measure relevant environmental indicat-
ors, but corporate reports by the mining industry
are not standardized and often struggle to weigh
relevant inclusions and explanations. The numer-
ous changes in reporting requirements (figure 9)
have progressed through consumer/investor pres-
sures to use disclosure programs that offer unique
insights and indicators for specific environmental
impacts or concerns related to the energy trans-
ition [42–45]. CDP’s quantitative focus is meant to
simplify and standardize GHG emissions reporting
while empowering ‘investors, companies, cities, and
national and regional governments to make the right
choices… for people and planet in the long term’ [35,
p 1]. The TCFD aims to ‘help firms understand what
financial markets want from disclosure in order to
measure and respond to climate change risks’ [46, p
1]. A company’s GRI guided sustainability report is
meant to ‘demonstrate(s) the link between its strategy
and its commitment to a sustainable global economy’,
and promotes ‘climate change, human rights, gov-
ernance and social well-being’ [15, p 1]
The issue with these developments is that there
is no underlying framework to identify the specific
interactions between the mining industry and the
environment, or to enable the selection and oper-
ationalization of the most relevant environmental
indicators [47]. Each initiative varies in status (legal
requirement vs. voluntary disclosure), scope (climate
vs. impacts), and ambition(discourse vs. strategy),
which is meant to present an encompassing picture of
ESG developments, but instead forces companies to
focus on specific ‘silos of sustainability’ within their
organization and balance what is relevant for specific
disclosures and what is financially best for their com-
pany [47, 48]. Depoers et al (2016) illustrates this
point in its study of SBF 120 (Société des Bourses
Françaises 120 Index) firms, where it was found that
managers adapt their disclosure strategy to address
the information needs of different stakeholder groups
by changing sources, traceability, and inclusions [49].
In promoting the analysis of dozens of indicators that
neglect interactive effects and ‘the state of the socio-
ecological systems from which they are drawn’ [47,
p 73], there is an overt emphasis on individual met-
rics and not a company’s actual sustainability prac-
tices [47].
This focus on individual metrics and general
indicators can be seen at the end of almost every
published sustainability report, where mining com-
panies provide content indices on what metric was
addressed, the response, the page number it can be
found, what sustainability principles it was supposed
tomeet, if it has external assurance, and why it counts
as a sufficient response. This is especially relevant for
the extractive industry, where the sale of anonymous,
primary goods creates the ‘essential conflict between
financial and other bottom lines, which, for the fore-
seeable future at least, the financial will always win’
[47, p 72, 50]. With no market differentiation, and
operating under a collective industry reputation, the
appearance of sustainability becomes just as valuable
as actual practice. This often leads to companies to
report with numerous initiatives, without the addi-
tional initiatives having dramatic effects on report-
ing. Mark Carney, Chairman of the Financial Sta-
bility Board, conveyed this best when introducing
the TCFD in 2015 [51]. With nearly 400 initiat-
ives aimed at relaying the costs, opportunities, and
risks associated with climate change, meeting effect-
ive disclosure standards requires coordination, and
‘the existing surfeit of existing schemes and fragmen-
ted disclosures means a risk of getting ‘lost in the
right direction” [51, p 1]. Similar challenges exist
within the Extractive Industries Transparency Initi-
ative (EITI) which seeks to foster accountability and
minimize corruption in the oil, gas, and mining sec-
tors, but often has mixed outcomes in its ability to
promote broader improved governance or sustainab-
ility [52, 53].
3.3. Comparability
The lack of contextualized disclosures for the min-
ing industry limits sustainability reporting initiatives,
and users of their data, in their ability to convey
a company’s progress towards sustainability. Con-
structive critiques of reporting methodologies spe-
cifically cite the lack of guidance for geographic
variations, scales, and interactive effects as major
drawbacks [47]. These are especially prominent when
considering the environmental impacts of different
production routes, as they can reflect everything from
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Figure 10. Impacts of the iron and steelmaking sector [12].
‘ore mineralogy and grade, mining type and avail-
able technologies, to resources for the mining and
processing’ [16, p 100]. Further, with a large num-
ber of multinational feed streams, waste streams, by-
product streams, and energy inputs associated with
mining and processing, reporting frameworks are not
capable of characterizing the entire supply chain of a
mineral, or of specific production challenges. For the
energy transition in particular, it is especially neces-
sary to be aware of environmental reduction levers
(figure 7), including the feasibility of adopting renew-
able technologies, and the regional energy mixes.
The scope and scale of environmental concerns
is not limited to minor metals, but also to miner-
als and metals with established markets. For the steel
industry, with a large global production chain, these
influences can be seen in figure 10. For example, the
United Nations Global Resources Outlook reported
that the first processing step in the primary produc-
tion of steel accounts for more impacts than the iron
ore extraction phase for all reported indicators, and
the climate change impacts for secondary steel pro-
duction can vary as much as 10%–38% due to the
electricity mixes between countries (figure 10) [12].
This has led many companies to attempt to curb
their Scope 3 emissions, both upstream and down-
stream. For companies like Rio Tinto, who sell large
amounts of iron ore to China, they have attempted to
curb their Scope 3 emissions by pledging $400 mil-
lion to help reduce their customer China Baowu Steel
Group’s emissions [54]. They hope to reduce their
own supply chain emissions through their clients use
of less metallurgical coal, transportation optimiza-
tion, and possibly the unproven commercialization
of hydrogen steel [54]. These changes and develop-
ments are in contrast to reports by American copper
producing companies who state that truck haulage
is a focused concern for both cost and GHG emis-
sions, and that through site development and falling
ore grades, ‘trucks are required to move ore farther
distances to processing facilities’ [55, p 26, 56]. With
different focuses on environmental concerns and dif-
ferent reduction levers (figure 7), using generalized
reporting initiatives to compare environmental path-
ways and emission reductions is not comprehensive.
In the context of global production networks and
international supply chains, the dismissal of holistic
and systemic perspectives diminishes comparability
and assessment of progress [47, 57].
3.4. Quantitative comparisons
The lack of contextualized disclosures can limit com-
parability between sustainability pathways, yet more
focused and quantitative guidance can also fail to
encompass relevant environmental considerations.
Investigations into comparing quantitative aspects of
sustainability reports formining and processing com-
panies have found that ‘it is impossible… in a credible
manner’ and not useful ‘to classify firms on this basis’
[57, p 25]. Henri and Boiral’s 2015 study of mining
sustainability reports compared only A or A + GRI
reports (the highest rated) and still ran into issues
including:
(a) Measuring unmeasurable or unspecific inform-
ation.
(b) Comparing incomparable measurements.
(c) Interpreting incomplete or ambiguous inform-
ation.
(d) Analyzing opaque or self-proclaimed reports.
The study found that ‘less than 50% of all GRI
indicators focused on quantitative measurements,’
[57, p 16] while the rest were unmeasurable and
9
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Figure 11. An overview of the number of Scope 3 emissions categories reported for 2015 CDP reports [17]. © EDP Sciences, 2018.
unspecific [57]. The result was a sea ofwords or ‘tower
of Babel syndrome’ [58, p 1] that makes it difficult
to interpret differentiating criteria while giving firms
a great deal of freedom in how they responded and
what they presented [57, 58, p1]. Critical informa-
tion, such as weight of transported hazardous waste,
was often incomplete or completely absent, while
companies like Codelco wrote as much as 20 pages on
renewable energy, salmon farming, and educational
projects in Chile (2008), and Newmont more than
60 pages on the firm’s sustainability management
system [57].
The complications of having accurate, topical,
and substantive measurements were further exacer-
bated by the existence of several affiliate organiza-
tions and different levels of data aggregation, even
among single reports. Companies such as Rio Tinto
were able to disclose information both with and
without Alcan (a subsidiary purchased in 2007)
depending on the indicator they were reporting,
all while maintaining an A or A+ reporting score
[57]. Even among CDP reports, Andre and Cortese
(2012) examined disclosures of metals and min-
ing companies operating in the Australasian region
to determine whether voluntary information can
provide a meaningful basis for climate change related
decision making [59]. While acknowledging the
important work the CDP undertakes, the combina-
tion of various disclosure methods, and the absence
of emissions data, compounded difficulties and led
to the conclusion that ‘the CDP information is
not comparable, and by extension, limited in its
usefulness’ [59, p 14].
4. Common evidence and themes within
the literature
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, corporate mining
reports serve a significant purpose. In this section we
show they do establish a common ground for evid-
ence, albeit emerging and often incomplete, on CHG
emissions, life-cycle assessment (LCA)-based calcula-
tions, and impacts in developing countries.
4.1. GHG emissions
Whereas calculation standards, protocols, and meth-
odologies are well established for Scope 1 and Scope
2 emissions, the recent interest in Scope 3 emis-
sions has presented a challenge in accurately map-
ping and reporting GHG from global supply chains.
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Corporate Value Chain
(Scope 3) Standard provides guidance and evaluation
tools for Scope 3 emissions, but companies are still
allowed to choose what values to report, the bound-
aries for emissions categories, and even what categor-
ies they consider relevant. Looking at figure 11, no
mining company reported more than nine categor-
ies in 2018, with other inclusions being written off as
not relevant [17]. Greene (2018) highlights the diffi-
culties of comparing selective disclosures in her study
10
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Figure 12. Global steel production by country and region (North American free trade agreement (NAFTA), Commonwealth of
Independent States) [63].
of CDP reports and Scope 3 emissions stating that
‘incomplete reports make it difficult to track emis-
sions reduction goals or implement sustainable sup-
ply chain improvements’ [17, p 1]. These inclusions
are especially relevant when considering that ‘emis-
sions reported by one company operating at one stage
of the life cycle contribute to the value chain emis-
sions of another,’ [17, p 7] and that GHG emissions
from the value chain can amount to over 90% of total
emissions for some companies [17].
Reported values become even more convoluted
when considering that companies rely on default data
to obtain their values and emissions factors, since
supplier data is often difficult to obtain [47, 17]. For
minerals and metals specifically, being a commod-
ity with long life-cycles and further processing needs
means that most reporting companies have to make
assumptions for end product uses and general pro-
cessing routes. This often means assuming a conver-
sion factor for ore feedstock, that all ore is conver-
ted to metal, and that all produced metal has the
same emissions factor. These values can vary greatly
depending on life-cycle assumptions, where a product
is sold to, and the purchasing companies own sub-
sequent emissions and policies.
4.2. LCA based calculations
With supplier data difficult to obtain, and global value
chains becoming increasingly complex, many repor-
ted values are based off of LCA, which have their own
caveats related to supply chains, metrics, and func-
tion. The use of LCAs as a tool to promote the sus-
tainable design and redesign of products and pro-
cesses is part of what has led to the adoption of renew-
able technologies and positive environmental changes
in the mining industry. However, ‘LCA is a relat-
ive tool intended for comparison and not absolute
evaluation,’ [60, p 1] which can limit its effectiveness
in supporting environmental disclosures and repres-
entation of entire supply chains [60]. While data on
global warming potential and energy inputs are well
documented in life cycle inventories (LCIs), ‘other
relevant impacts resulting from, e.g. acidification,
heavy metal emissions, water or land use are frag-
mentary’ [19, 93]. Nuss and Eckleman’s 2014 LCA of
63metals in their major use forms was the most com-
prehensive life cycle comparison of metals to date,
but ‘impacts other than global warming potential
and cumulative energy demand could not be further
investigated … due to the limited availability of life
cycle inventory data’ [19, 61, p 4]. Nuss and Eckle-
man (2014) also states problems with LCI data being
reported in aggregate form at ‘either pre-allocated
or at system process level,’ [61, p 2] which makes
it difficult to make robust comparisons or to take
co-production issues with minerals and metals into
account [61]. Co-production is especially import-
ant for the energy transition as many of the mater-
ials needed for renewable technologies occur as sec-
ondary minerals that are embedded in base metals
(including rare earth’s, indium, and tellurium) [62].
Manhart et al (2018) also warns that major obstacles
for assessing the life-cycle environmental relevance of
primary raw materials are the lack of ‘representative
data for the mining sector on a global level’ [19, p 94]
and ‘the current lack of scientifically sound models
for input categories on resources, which are particu-
larly relevant for mining’ [19, 93].
These LCA considerations are apparent in the
steel and lithium industries and highlight the need to
consider entire supply chains. Greene (2017) conveys
some of these shortcomings in writing that life cycle
data commonly used in the steel sector is based on a
small set of studies and geographic regions, and that
the World Steel Association’s choice of boundaries
can leave out important emissions [17, 64]. The
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Figure 13. Concentrated mineral supplies for cobalt, tellurium, and rare earth elements [29]. © UTS 2019.
World Steel Association (WSA) reports 1.83 tonnes
CO2/tonne crude steel cast (2017), (the same value
used by BHP’s methodology in 2018), and uses indic-
ators from ‘85 steel companies… representing 56%of
global crude steel production’ [65, p 1]. With China
representing 51.3% of global steel production (figure
12), coal supplying 75% of energy demand for global
steel production, and China being one of the world’s
worst coal users and polluters, it can be hard to eval-
uate how representative aggregate values like these
are, or how efficiently they can be used in reporting,
without considering emissions intensity by geography
[63, 66, 67]. For steel specifically, a 2016 comparison
of carbon dioxide emissions intensity of production
methods between various countries found that ‘if the
German, Mexican, and U.S. steel industries were sim-
ilar in structure to the Chinese steel industry… the
CO2 emissions intensity of steel production in Ger-
many, Mexico, and the U.S. would increase by 19%,
92%, and 56%, respectively’ [68, p 16]. Together these
variations show that LCAs need to be taken in con-
text, but that they can also provide valuable insights
into supply chains and possible points of intervention
for environmental sustainability.
4.3. Environmental impacts in developing
economies
Sustainability reports are meant to disclose negat-
ive environmental impacts in any developing eco-
nomy, but this process has become increasingly con-
voluted. In the past, well publicized environmental
disasters led to the ICMM ‘crisis,’ [42, p 1] and for
mining companies to position themselves as drivers
of sustainable development in emerging economies
[38, 40, 69, 70]. The agreement that multinational
mining companies should operate in accordance with
international environmental standards, despite the
lack of regulatory enforcement in developing coun-
tries, assuaged concerns that multinational mining
corporations might exploit people and resources
[40, 71, 72]. This is once again becoming a major
concern due to the geographic concentration of min-
erals and metals for the energy transition, and their
subsequent vulnerability to price fluctuations and
detrimental environmental/social practices. This has
already been seen in the DRC with cobalt and REEs
in China, and further concentrated supply of cobalt,
rare earths, and tellurium can be seen in figure 13
[29]. Australia, the DRC, and South Africa have large
shares of the production of metals for Li-ion batter-
ies [29]. Japan, Korea, Canada, and Russia have signi-
ficant production levels of metals for photovoltaics,
while Chile, Argentina, and Peru have over half of the
world’s lithium [29, 73].
Impacts in developing countries are still under-
reported, despite the numerous published projects
and initiatives bymining companies. True Footprint’s
analysis of annual reports from 23 mining companies
found that 70%ofmaterial indicators used for report-
ing were of inputs and outputs (howmuch was spent,
howmanynatural resourceswere used, what activities
were conducted), while only 26% explained the actual
outcomes, and 4.5% the impacts [34]. The same ana-
lysis showed that it was possible to report outcomes
for all material sustainability topics, but that compan-
ies chose not to, despite the outcome being poten-
tially positive in some cases, as it was not required
for reporting [34]. A study by Boiral (2013), found
sustainability reports to mainly be a ‘simulacra,’ [74,
p 1] due to their disconnect from reality, the dis-
tortion of information, and the use of images that
were not considered relevant [74]. The ‘emphasis on
the firm’s positive achievements,’ ‘emphasis on virtu-
ous statements and commitments,’ and ‘showcasing
of outside awards and distinctions,’ [74, p 25] lim-
ited their reliability in conveying relevant informa-
tion, while pictures of unspoiled nature and stew-
ardship led to further misrepresentation [74]. The
counter accounting analysis showed that ‘only 10% of
significant news events concerning sustainable devel-
opment were reported clearly and explicitly in the
sustainability reports,’ [74, p 25] while the prolifer-
ation of images were largely disconnected from the
firms’ genuine impacts [74]. For developing coun-
tries, this presents a false image of sustainability
and progress.
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Figure 14. Estimated number of artisanal and small-scale miners as percentage of rural population [83].
5. Common lacunae andmissing
information within the literature
While the common themes of included evidence are
perhaps striking, just as significant is what is missing
within the body of evidence, notably gaps in environ-
mental reporting, scant focus on artisanal or small-
scale mining, and an inability to capture illegal or
criminal supply chains.
5.1. Gaps in environmental reporting within
sustainability reports
Sustainability reports, and most environmental
methodologies, do not include unreported, unre-
gistered, or even illegal mineral and metal produc-
tion, despite the large role that they play in global
supply chains and environmental impacts. Intro-
duction of these materials primarily occur at the
beginning of the supply chain following extraction
and prior to processing. The growth of artisanal
or small-scale mining (ASM) is already an envir-
onmental concern for developing economies, even
without the large increases in demand for minerals
and metals that is expected with the energy trans-
ition. There are an estimated 40.5 million people
engaged in ASM in 2017, up from 30 million in 2014,
13 million in 1999, and 6 million in 1993, com-
pared to the 7 million working in industrial min-
ing in 2013 [75]. With the majority of ASM work-
ers using rudimentary tools and techniques, there
are significant health and environmental impacts
associated with their operations. Among environ-
mental concerns are fine particles from blasting and
drilling that degrade crops and farmland, streams
and rivers becoming toxic, and exposure to mercury,
zinc, vapor, cyanide, and even radioactive materials
[25, 75]. Scientific American’s list of toxic pollution
problems lists mining related activities as respons-
ible for three of the top ten global issues, with mer-
cury pollution from artisanal mining as the worst
global toxic pollution problem [76].While gold is
not as tied to renewable technology as other mater-
ials, large price increases for renewable materials
have already seen similar spikes in artisanal mining
operations.
5.2. Artisanal and small-scale mining enterprises
Existing examples of these practices and their envir-
onmental implications can be seen in parts of Africa
and China [77–79]. Fortunes 2018 report, Blood,
Sweat, and Batteries shows what increased prices for
cobalt can do to insufficiently supported communit-
ies, while in 2019 the death of 43 miners once again
demonstrated the impact of cobaltmining in theDRC
[77–80]. Reports have found asmany as 255 000 artis-
anal miners for cobalt in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, 35 000 of who are children working in
‘exceedingly harsh, hazardous, and toxic conditions’
[79, 81, p 1, 82]. As for where these materials go, the
Chinese middle men haggling over cobalt prices in
Mosomp cobalt market, and the children in a small
village near Kolwezi greeting reporters with ‘Ni hao!’
[79, p 1] implicates China, the world’s largest con-
sumer of metals [79].
5.3. Illegal or criminal supply chains
Investigations into rare earth supply chains have
found that illegal sources can add as much as 40%
of official Chinese production, the results of which
are tied to ‘enormous social and environmental prob-
lems’ [84, p 6744]. Due to rare earthmining in Jiangxi
province, the region is facing a $5.5 billion cleanup
bill, with a focal point of the cleanup focusing on
keeping the polluted water from reaching a wider
area in neighboring provinces [25]. Ma Jun, a leading
Chinese environmentalist, and director of the Insti-
tute for Public and Environmental Affairs, says that
he fears other regions around the world could suffer
a similar fate if they become like China, and are the
supplier of cheap rare earth elements with little or no
environmental price attached [25].
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Figure 15. Share of primary demand for copper from wind, solar, PV, and batteries [29]. © UTS 2019.
These concerns over legal and accountable sup-
ply chains are very real, with ASM taking up entire
percentages of populations (figure 14), and believed
to account for 15%–20% of global non-fuel min-
eral production [75, 84]. With mining corporations
only reporting on their own operations, LCA’s not
accounting for external variables, and supply chains
getting partially fueled by unreported ASM, environ-
mental impact methodologies are once again proving
to be non-inclusive. Minerals and metals are entering
supply chains, but not being properly accounted for
in a global context.
6. A case study in corporate governance:
copper
In this section, to illustrate the tensions and chal-
lenges with corporate mining governance reported
in the earlier sections, the GHG emissions as repor-
ted by copper producing companies are compared to
evaluate environmental impact methodologies. GHG
emissions are used due to their quantitative and com-
parable nature.
6.1. Copper as an exemplar for low-carbon
transitions
Copper’s role in both conventional and low-carbon
energy transitions is well established through
conventional motors, wiring, and circuitry to its
substantial use in wind turbines, solar, panels, and
energy storage technologies (figure 15) [1, 85, 86].
Estimates by the Institute for Sustainable Futures
show that peak annual demand for copper in renew-
able energy and storage could account for as much
as 29% of annual production by 2050 (2017 data)
[29]. Copper is representative of numerous minerals
and metals by demonstrating environmental con-
cerns along numerous points throughout its lifecycle.
Unlike steel or aluminum production, which have a
large environmental focus on processing, copper has
GHG emissions from extraction, hauling, commin-
ution, and processing, which makes it representative
of a greater number of GHG emissions from other
minerals and mining practices. Calls for emissions
transparency by Azadi et al (2020), and copper’s his-
torical role as an environmental polluter, make it a
valuable case study to assess environmental impact
methodology [16]. To ensure consistency in evalu-
ated impact, only the reported GHG emissions will
be compared for copper mining entities.
6.2. Calculating the environmental impacts of
copper
Of the top ten copper producers, only six reported
to CDP, and only five are members of the ICMM
[42, 44, 88]. From these five companies, BHP, Vale,
and Freeport were chosen to represent varied CDP
and GRI reporting scores (table 1), and as an indica-
tion of completion. For 2018, all three companies cre-
ated sustainability reports following GRI guidelines,
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Table 1. Reporting scores for BHP, Freeport, and Vale.
Company 2018 CDP Score 2019 Score
Preparedness for
a Low-Carbon
Transition (rank) [87] ICMMMembership GRI
BHP A A- #3/12 Founding Member In accordance—
Comprehensive




C F #11/12 Founding Member In accordance—
Core
Table 2. Scope 3 and embodied emissions in copper, iron ore, metallurgical coal, and energy coal base (based on BHP data).
reported to CDP’s Climate Change 2018 question-
naire, and had third party verification for their
emissions values [89–91]. As such, CDP and GRI-
guided sustainability reports from BHP, Freeport-
McMoRan, and Vale were used as the data source
for this case study. Comparison of GRI reports,
CDP reports, disclosed emissions factors, emissions
sources, and reporting requirements were used to
effectively compare reporting methods. From this,
discrepancies and misalignments were focused on
and elaborated in the sections below.
BHP is used as a best case scenario due to the
external publication of a supplementary Scope 3 Emis-
sions Calculation Methodology 2018, and separate
GHG data [92, 93]. Through these published supple-
ments, the embodied emissions in one ton of cop-
per was calculated with the assumption that percent-
age share of mined material (by weight and excluding
petroleum) was reflective of percentage share of the
upstream reported Scope 3 emissions (table 2). From
these assumptions, the resulting calculated Scope 3
emissions factor was found to equal 4.27 tonnes CO2e
per ton of copper produced by BHP. Calculated Scope
3 values were then added to BHP’s Scope 1 and Scope
2 values to get the total emissions for one ton of cop-
per produced by BHP and accounted for by their
methodology. Using BHP’s new calculated emissions
factor, the reported production values and emissions
of Freeport-McMoRan and Vale were compared as a
means to evaluate environmental calculation meth-
odologies.
6.3. Freeport-McMoRan
Freeport reported on 3/15 Scope 3 categories as out-
lined by the Greenhouse Gas Protocol [94], but of
specific interest are the Scope 3 categories relating to
processing of sold products and use of sold products.
When reporting 263 584metric tonnes of CO2e emit-
ted for the Processing of Sold Products, the calcu-
lation methodology states that ‘because Freeport-
McMoRan operates vertically integrated assets, many
downstream processing emissions that would be con-
sidered Scope 3 emissions for other companies are
Scope 1 emissions for Freeport-McMoRan’ [95, p
16]. This is reflective of Freeport-McMoRan owned
smelters, where the emissions reported on processing
of sold products ‘only represent emissions from the
smelting of concentrate and the refining of copper
anodes sold to third parties’ [95, p 16] and were
calculated by applying average emissions at Freeport
smelters to the amount of material sold to third
parties. Freeport also reported that they ‘do not
have access to emissions information for the broad
spectrum of downstream manufacturing’ [95, p 16]
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Figure 16. Freeport’s 2018 reported emissions (copper, gold, molybdenum) vs Freeport’s 2018 emissions using BHP methodology.
Figure 17. Reported emissions BHP vs Vale.
and chose not to report emissions for Use of Sold
Products.
This study could not find material specific
emissions for 2018, so for comparative purposes,
Freeport’s 2018 copper production of 3813 mil-
lion pounds, and sales of 3811 million pounds,
were multiplied by BHP’s calculated Scope 1 and
2 emissions factors and BHP’s calculated Scope 3
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Figure 18. Production change vs emissions for BHP.
Figure 19. Production change vs emissions for Vale.
emissions factors (respectively) to get an estim-
ate of Freeports emissions using BHP’s method-
ology. These values therefore represent a conser-
vative estimate of what Freeport would emit using
BHP’s methodology. Figure 16 shows how even
ignoring potential emissions from Freeports pro-
duction of gold and molybdenum, BHP’s meth-
odology predicts much larger emissions for Scope
3 emissions. Scope 1 emissions and total opera-
tional emissions are slightly lower using BHP’s meth-
odology, which is reflective of Freeport’s vertical
integration, but overall, total reported emissions
would be 64% higher for Freeport using BHP’s
methods.
6.4. Vale
Vale’s emissions were relatively similar to BHP’s,
but its calculation methodology/strategy does not
reflect its changes in operations and is indicative of
drastic swings in reporting or problemswith emission
accounting. Vale does not take a vertical integra-
tion approach like Freeport, and its relative Scope
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Figure 20. BHP operational emissions vs Scope 3 emissions.
3 emissions are similar to BHP based on reported
emission values (figure 17), but its Scope 3 emissions
drastically changed between 2017 and 2018. With a
jump from327.6million tonnes of CO2e to 586.2mil-
lion tonnes of CO2e, Vale reported an almost 80%
increase in Scope 3 emissions from one year to the
next [90, 96].
A supplement could not be found to explain its
reporting methodology, but Vale actively cites the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol in both its 2017 and 2018
CDP report. In its independently published 2018 sus-
tainability report, for Scope 3 emissions Vale wrote
‘In 2018, these emissions totaled approximately 586
million tCO2e in the year, a result very similar to
that of 2017’ [90, p 78]. The nearly 80% increase is
not mentioned or explained. Operational changes
also do not explain the shift, as Vale produced less
manganese ore, nickel, copper, cobalt, and gold than
in 2017. Small increases in iron ore, iron pellets, and
coal, could not have caused such a drastic shift, unless
the embodies emissions were over 13 000 tonnes of
CO2e per tonne of iron and over 27 000 tonnes of
CO2e per tonne of coal (assuming the same emis-
sions as calculated from BHP, table 2). The cumu-
lative production change relative to the change in
Scope 3 emissions is shown in figures 18 and 19, with
BHP’s relative production and emissions changes
shown for contrast. From this drastic shift, it can
be assumed that emissions methodologies are still
evolving despite the numerous forms of guidance,
and Vale’s commitment to substantial Scope 3
values.
6.5. BHP
BHP has become a leader in disclosure transpar-
ency through its Scope 3 Emissions Calculation
Methodology and unrestricted Scope 3 values (fig-
ure 20), but that does not mean it is without meth-
odology concerns. For 2018, its Scope 3 emissions
methodology relies on numerous assumptions and
‘double counting’ [92, p 4]. For its processing of sold
products calculations, the Scope 3 Emissions Calcu-
lation Methodology 2018 used copper production of
1237 648 tonnes, citing the BHP Operational Review
for the year end 30 June 2018 as the source, and with
the assumption that ‘production volumes approxim-
ate sales volumes; small year-end inventory volumes
will be smoothed out over year-on-year calculations’
[92, p 27]. However, BHPs Operational Review for
the year end 30 June 2018 (published on 18 July
2018), reports 1753 kt of copper production for FY18,
leaving nearly 500 000 tonnes of copper unaccounted
for in its Scope 3 calculation, or over 2 million tonnes
of CO2e [92, 97]. This review was not able to recon-
cile these values. Without a mapped supply chain, the
methodology also assumed a 1.0 conversion factor
between copper feedstock and end-use product, along
with assuming that all copper is manufactured into
copper wire [92]. This is not an inherently flawed
assumption, but it illustrates how generalized even
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themost advanced calculationmethodologies remain
for GHG accounting along supply chains. Finally, the
emissions factor used in the calculation is 4.2 tonnes
CO2e per tonne copper wire produced, which is based
on a 2012 LCA that is meant to represent ‘all emis-
sions associated with mining and extracting ore to
create copper cathodes, as well as subsequent man-
ufacturing into copper wires’ [92, p 28]. This emis-
sions factor is presented as a ‘conservative’ assump-
tion that is also meant to reasonably reflect ‘local
electricity emissions intensity and other factors’ with
no explanation how, or why, other than reminders
that it will ‘provide a high-side estimation of emis-
sions in BHP’s value chain from this process’ [92, p
28]. Together these values represent a calculated 8.57
tonnes of CO2e per ton of copper produced by BHP,
which is in contrast to the International Copper Asso-
ciation’s most recent LCA for cradle-to-gate copper,
that cites the entire embodied emissions for 1 metric
ton of copper cathode as 4100 kg CO2e.
7. Conclusion and further research
Many committed governments, investors, companies,
and consumers are searching for better ways to effect-
ively identify and manage the environmental impacts
of rapidly growing mineral supply chains. With the
advent of a global economy, it has become difficult to
track the impacts of the numerous inputs, processes,
and activities involved with the use and production
of minerals and metals. This lack of transparency has
in turn highlighted the need for better methods and
understanding of environmental impacts especially at
the early stages of extraction and processing.
Our copper case study demonstrates that themin-
ing industry’s ability to measure GHG emissions are
likely inaccurate, incomplete, and differ dramatic-
ally from company to company. When looking at
this variability for the same measurements, and for
the same materials, it becomes clear that the pro-
cess lacks cohesion and transparency. Even among
what one would consider essential information, or
highly quantitative values, such as CO2e, the variance
in methodology, inclusion criteria, and what is con-
sidered relevant, make it almost impossible to com-
pare or evaluate a company’s effectiveness at report-
ing. BHP explicitly stated that they were overestimat-
ing their emissions to present themselves as taking a
conservative approach. Other companies were able to
select what emissions they chose to report or explain,
and some left potentially enormous amounts of emis-
sions unaccounted for. When considering these inac-
curacies in the context of other minerals, metals, and
mining companies, it is hard to claim that we have
a clear understanding of the mining industry’s GHG
emissions and environmental impacts. When further
buttressed by the assumptions made through LCAs,
and the lack of accounting for ASM, it is clear that the
environmental impacts of mineral and metal extrac-
tion are likely much larger than currently estimated.
This has extremely troubling and sobering implica-
tions for those seeking to verify and validate the feas-
ibility of a low-carbon transition.
In general, many of the world’s largest mining
companies have tried to demonstrate their commit-
ment to reducing their environmental impacts, but
without consistency, it is difficult to create trusted
data. A standardized method for reporting envir-
onmental impacts is needed. This review contrib-
utes towards this goal by identifying gaps in current
reporting mechanisms, as well as best practices, and
key potential areas for further analysis. In identifying
these contours, environmental reporting by mining
companies can be improved to better represent the
evolving shift towards accountability that is needed
for a low-carbon environment.
This review offers a benchmark for future cor-
porate governance and understanding of metal and
mineral supply chains. By starting at the beginning
of the supply chain and focusing on extraction and
processing, it is possible to identify several areas for
further research and a comprehensive path forward.
These actionable steps, and further work needed to
implement them, are as follows:
(a) The development of a more uniform, widely
accepted and consistent carbon account-
ing framework for the metals and minerals
industry.
1. There needs to be alignment between com-
panies on mineral-related standards and
initiatives for accurate climate reporting.
Discrepancies between inclusions, bound-
ary definitions, and what type of data is
considered viable, all make it impossible to
compare carbon emissions across compan-
ies.
2. A region-, or supplier-, specific open source
database of carbon intensity factors for vari-
ous products, process, and activities would
allow for upstreamusers of theseminerals to
estimate supply chain emissions more reli-
ably and accurately and could support sus-
tainable procurement efforts.
(b) Integration and sourcing of information
from previous measurement efforts of energy
security and material development. These
sources will prove valuable in both political
and technical approaches as lessons on min-
eral development can be applied to developing
industries.
3. Continued monitoring of governance met-
rics (through initiatives such as the Resource
Governance Index) and open dialogue with
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developing nation will be essential in prop-
erly supporting countries involved in the
energy transition.
4. More LCAs need to be used to raise aware-
ness of governance shortcomings and envir-
onmental sustainability. Social LCAs can
help companies understand how to maxim-
ize societal benefits from mining projects
and raise awareness of potential pitfalls and
lessons from other resource-rich nations.
LCAs can also be used to help identify points
of intervention within supply chains. The
current top-down approach of having com-
panies choose what to report is not condu-
cive of mineral or environmental sustainab-
ility.
5. If more reliable data becomes available,
a meta-analysis of existing environmental
issues would be essential to progress envir-
onmental accountability within the mining
industry.
(c) Transparency within supply chains and the
implications of legislative actions need to be
better considered when developing policy that
affects the wellbeing of those in other nations.
6. Dialogues are needed for establishing
cooperation between mining companies
and government agencies in charge of plans
for governance and communal develop-
ment. In most countries, these dialogues are
not well-established, and must be linked to
wider efforts of diversification and growth.
7. A method for mining companies to relay
their positive environmental developments
and be recognized for their continued
efforts. The initiatives outlined in ESG
reports are relatively superficial as com-
panies are limited in their ability to accur-
ately convey information. When actual pro-
gress can be conveyed, larger developmental
change can be justified for the benefit of
both the company and communities.
These points underscore how accounting for car-
bon and environmental performance across mineral
supply chains is a complex, polycentric endeavor.
It involves accounting frameworks and corporate
governance institutions, transnational mining firms,
ASM groups, intergovernmental institutions, suppli-
ers, policymakers, and of course consumers. But this
complexity of mining supply chains is not only a
curse; it can also be a blessing, given that any one
of these stakeholder groups can exert influence and
pressure across the entire sector. And if there is a con-
certed push across many stakeholder groups, a coali-
tion of those willing to be sustainable and promote
best practices, then mining may very well contrib-
ute towards our low-carbon and environmentally sus-
tainable future, rather than risking to diminish it.
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